Governing the Commons through Rule Hybridity: Interactions Between Formal Institutions and Informal Norms in CPR Management

Abstract

This article discusses the relationship between formal institutions and informal norms in the governance of common-pool resources (CPRs). Moving beyond the separation of legal and customary rule systems, the article conceptualizes governance as a hybrid process that is shaped by overlapping norms, actor behavior, and institutional layering. This article draws on three comparative case studies in community forestry in Nepal, canal irrigation in South India, and coastal fisheries in Ghana to explore synergies, substitutions, and conflicts between dual rule systems at the operational, collective-choice, and constitutional levels. Findings show that governance outcomes such as compliance, sustainability, and legitimacy are not determined by whether rules are formal or informal, but by the degree of congruence between local values and power structures. The article advances institutional theory by extending the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to account for institutional hybridity and legal pluralism. It shows that legitimacy and effectiveness in CPR management are a result of mutual recognition, negotiated authority, and norm alignment rather than solely top-down enforcement. Recommendations emphasize the need to incorporate culturally embedded norms into formal governance systems, support inclusive decision-making, and build adaptive rule structures that respond to socio-ecological feedback. This research has practical implications for environmental policymakers, development practitioners, and scholars in designing more context-sensitive approaches to CPR governance.