
RESEARCH ARTICLE

Analysis of Elite Contestation and Political Base of the GOLKAR Party during the 2014-2016 Joko Widodo Administration

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to examine the elite contestation and political base of the GOLKAR Party during the 2014-2016 Joko Widodo administration. From this analysis, the following novelties are observed. Firstly, elite contestation often evaluates the power struggle only, although it is presently analyzed with its socio-political base. Secondly, the existing study of elite cooperation and competition prioritizes the experience of liberal democracies in the Western tradition, requiring elite autonomy from the state. In this case, the elites in the GOLKAR competition and cooperation are interrelated with the state. Thirdly, elite theory is presently used with contestation in political party organizations despite relevant implementation not being performed after tracing and exploring bibliometrics with the VOSviewer application. These three studies show that only strong party institutions and elite adaptation are required in the new system during a political transition. In the qualitative study, the elites successfully build networks and cooperate with government elites and organizations, which also possess the popularity, leadership, *reputation*, and capital to succeed in contestation using quantitative data.

KEYWORDS

Elite, Social Base, Political Party, Networks and State Actors.

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
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1. Introduction

The fall of Indonesia's New Order socio-political structure is responsible for the establishment of democratization, which was marked by President Soeharto's resignation from the national elite leadership on May 21, 1998. Based on the experience in Latin American countries (O'Donneel 1993: i-xiv), many patterns were analyzed to motivate elite circulation. These patterns did not adhere to a single path, with the onset of a financial crisis considered a driving factor causing economic and political distress. The crisis also spread to other sectors, specifically the people's loss of trust in the elites upholding national leadership.

Contemporary elite theorists John Higley and Jan Pakulski (Higley; Pakulski 2012:4-6) argued that worsening economic conditions in the UK and the US caused elite circulation, as shown in the following pattern representation.

Patterns of Indonesian Crisis and Elite Circulation in the Perspective of Higley & Pakulski



This was supported by the occurrence in Indonesia, where the economic and political crisis led to changes in the leadership of the national elite. From this context, the fall of the New Order government then caused major socio-political changes, indicating that the country experienced a phase of political liberalization in the early stages. In this stage, the expansion of people's rights was observed, with the state's loss of control leading to governmental disorganization, uncertainty, and an explosion of political participation (Eep; 2000; xii). Political euphoria was also one of the impacts that emerged in the socio-political reform era. In addition, a series of changes from an authoritarian to a democratic system was carried out, with only one socio-political organization, the Golongan Karya (GOLKAR) Party, placing itself in any situation. During the 32 years of President Soeharto's rule, the GOLKAR Party had a special position as a political machine, state party, or hegemonic union.

The fall of the New Order power is also responsible for the provision of a new symptom within the GOLKAR Party. According to Eva Etzioni Halevi and quoted by Engelstedt, the symptom was known as elite pluralism (Engelstedt, 2010). However, elite differentiation is often found in the language of Higley and Burton (Higley & Burton 2010). In this case, the dependence on the symptom does not emphasize President Soeharto despite being characterized by the spread of new elite power. This dispersed power led to democratization, marked by bottom-up decision-making and orderly succession. From this context, the new symptom needs to be deeply analyzed to determine the independence levels of the GOLKAR Party elites in conducting competition and cooperation to build democracy. This was in line with the perspectives of Halevi, who stated that the establishment of democracy depended on the independence of the elites. Therefore, this study aims to examine the GOLKAR Party elite contestation and its political base during 2014-2016. Joko Widodo administration, with the momentum of the National Conference being the object.

The struggle for the 2014-2016 GOLKAR chairman position is also prioritized, focusing on the conflict between the Aburizal Bakrie and Agung Laksono camps. These issues subsequently focus on the election of Setya Novanto against Ade Komarudin, with both candidates supported by President Joko Widodo and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, respectively. By using qualitative methods through literature reports and in-depth interviews, the GOLKAR Party elites always allow the participation of the ruling government's external parties in contestation. This is because the cooperation of the elites with the state often led to a successful contestation. From the description, Elite Autonomy is considered one of the theories of top-tier and party institutionalization. According to Halevy and quoted by Engelisted, democracy was commonly established when the elite was independent.

2. The GOLKAR Party Elite Cooperation and Competition: A Theoretical Review

According to Eva Etzioni Halevi and quoted by Engelested, the perspective of elite pluralism had developed in the GOLKAR Party. This was characterized by the distribution of authority and political base to various elites. From this context, political bases are led by prominent GOLKAR Party elites, including Akbar Tandjung, Agung Laksono, Jusuf Kalla, Aburizal Bakrie, Airlangga Hartarto, and Bambang Susatyo. Based on the initial emphasis on the Cendana spectrum, namely President Soeharto's residence, each elite's power is capable of gradually colouring the GOLKAR Party organization's decision-making system. All elites and their political bases also have similar opportunities to cooperate and compete for power resources in every contestation. This is because the strength of the post-New Order GOLKAR Party does not prioritize personal figures and personifications, although it emphasizes the programs, systems or party rules considered more democratic than the New Order era. The strength of this system and program also distinguishes the characteristics of the GOLKAR Party from other parties in Indonesia, which are presently related to a single power regarding the most prominent figure. Based on Poguntke and Web and quoted by Chrisnandi & Primariski (2014), the concept of political presidentialization was considered a situation where the leader possessed complete power without being challenged by other cabinets. This proved that only the supreme leader controlled the personal interests of a political organization (Primarizki & Chrisnandi, 2014). Poguntke and Web also stated that the GOLKAR Party did not have a dominant elite or figure, such as PDIP, Gerindra, Nasdem, and Democrat. However, the party with the Banyan tree logo consisted of many figures and factionalism, each with a political base.

Elite theory is found to explore exclusive cooperation and competition in the GOLKAR Party. Based on several previous reports, the level of state elites (Lopes 2013; Shamus Khan 2012), community organizations (Harsono & Roby 2020), and local exclusive competition (Ramli 2019) was highly reviewed. The theory also specifically portrays the Chinese Communist Party elite in political group regeneration (Kai Zou & Ge Zin 2020). In this present study, several reports emphasizing the argument that party elites are groups of people mainly managing conflict, competition and cooperation were used. This is because not everyone is capable of managing a political party. Besides the elite theory, a supporting theory focusing on party institutionalization is also implemented to strengthen relevant outcomes.

Based on the previous studies above, the pattern of formulating elites in an increasingly complex and plural society was not explained, and it was accompanied by the inadequate evaluation of relevant cooperative and competitive contributions due to different interests in the organization. This led to the implementation of John Higley and Burton (2010) differentiation (elite forming factors) and integration (elites political relations) concept to resolve the problems encountered. According to Heinrich Best, the concept was considered less relevant in explaining top-tier dynamics within an increasingly modern and complex society, where antagonistic cooperation was prioritized over elite integration. Therefore, preferred cooperation was often observed between elites to achieve greater common objectives without abandoning respective positions (Best 2010;102-103).

The GOLKAR Party is hindered by conflicts leading to separation during the Joko Widodo administration. Similar studies on factions and internal party conflicts in the reform era are also more driven by pragmatic issues of power than ideological factors. In this context, parties are vulnerable to division due to differences in the attitudes of cadres and party administrators regarding the support for presidential and vice-presidential candidates during elections (Blegur, 2013; Hanafi, 2018; Aisyah, 2021). Therefore, other applications are required because the sole implementation of the elite theory developed by Best and Burton-Higley is analytically insufficient. From the description, Frederick Engelisted elite theory of conflict and consensus, as well as Higley and Pakuslski's analysis of crisis and top-tier circulation, are implemented to examine GOLKAR problems. These theories are very relevant to describing contestation, cooperation, and networks in GOLKAR and Randall party institutionalization, where elite autonomy is considered a supporting theory (Randal, 2012).

In this study, the relevant elite theories are Eva Etzioni Halevei's concept of autonomy (Etzioni 1993), Henrich Best on antagonistic cooperation (Best 2010), and Fredrick Englisted on consensus and exclusive networks (Englisted 2010). Based on Higley and Burton, elite differentiation and integration were used. This is because differentiation is a concept related to the exclusive formulating groups, with integration emphasizing the establishment pattern of relationships or political cooperation (Higley & Burton 2010). For the GOLKAR Party, elite formers are often characterized by prominence, popularity, and organizational and managerial skills, which are supported by a strong political base. According to Huntington, a political expert from the USA, the social base focused

on the communal and individual groups consisting of similar ethnic or religious parties (Sahat translation 1970). Quoted by Engelsted, Halevei also essentially reviewed elite pluralism, which emphasized the number of exclusives in a social organization. This indicated that many sector and sub-sector elites should share power to ensure the development of democracies. Elite autonomy was also related to the distribution of resources between exclusives; for example, political superiors should not dominate other sector elites (Engelsted 2010; 62-65; Etzioni 1993; Arslan 2005). Meanwhile, party institutionalization is the process of stimulating organizations and organizational procedures toward acquiring standard and stable values. Randall and Svasand also added Kenneth H. Janda perspectives on the importance of parties within the public mind (reified) by introducing several contexts, including (1) systemness, (2) autonomy, (3) values and culture (value infusion), and (4) party image (reification) (Randall; Svasand, 2022). Frederick Engelsted subsequently provided a solution through consensus to regulate the relations between elites and reduce conflict. Moreover, elite autonomy needs to be institutionalized in two patterns, namely (1) The relationship between elites and (2) The association between exclusives and the state (Engelsted 2010; 70-71). For Henrich Best, the theory of antagonistic cooperation was developed by the American sociologist Sumner to explain the reasons and patterns by which political elites cooperate and limit conflict in the power struggle (Best 2010; 102-103).

3. Methods

This research method uses a qualitative approach that is descriptive analytical in nature. In research like this, researchers analyze social phenomena that occurred during a predetermined time period, namely the 2014-2016 Joko Widodo administration period. Researchers attempt to construct existing social realities or cultural meanings, and the focus of their research is on interacting processes or events where authenticity is the key and researchers are usually involved (Newman, 1997; 14). Data collection was done by conducting in-depth interviews and conducting a literature study. The informants were selected using the snowball method, whether they were from the GOLKAR Party or not, and they were people who had a direct connection to the topic of this research. Using qualitative methods, it can be found that the GOLKAR Party's policies are full of external pressure, particularly from the ruling president.

3.1 Dynamics of The GOLKAR Party: Conflict and Consensus

Party elites are people with various interests, with those forming a political party often requiring the enhancement of internally wrapped desires. These diverse interests require effective management, including the establishment of rules for the organization of shared desires, such as a political party. Since religious interests are institutionalized, many channels are then implemented to resolve the emergence of conflicts. According to Frederick Engelsted, democracy should be supported aside from elite autonomy and institutionalization, which includes the relationship between exclusives and the elites-state (Engelsted 2010; 65-66). Henrich Best also proposed the institutionalization between elites and non-elites, where the absence of this standardization channel caused the non-establishment of democracy (Best 2010;97-100).

Regarding the GOLKAR Party in Indonesia, party institutionalization has reportedly been performed by presenting the party game rule arrangement. In this case, the Articles of Association and Bylaws, Organizational Regulations, and Implementation Guidelines were part of the institutional arrangement, which emphasizes conflict resolution or "consensus" between elites with diverse interests. Therefore, "Why did the conflict between elites plague the GOLKAR Party at the beginning of the Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla administrations in 2014-2016?". To explain this conflict, the perspective of Frederick Engelsted should be used due to being able to review consensus. An Elite is a person upholding the highest position in a military, labour, business, and political administration organization (Engelsted 2010; 65-66). In this case, the General Chairman was an elite of the GOLKAR Party, regarding the possession of the highest position. From this context, the behaviours and mannerisms of the elite were very popular and highly observed in managing the organization. Since the GOLKAR Party is a party without a main figure or figurehead, the balance between elites is then maintained. Although the prerequisites for the establishment of democracy have been formed, the sector elites are still equal in responding to organizational issues (ibid), according to Engelsted's quotation about the language of Etzione.

The elite conflict of the GOLKAR Party began with different perspectives on the National Conference (Munas) of Aburizal Bakrie's leadership period, which ended in December 2014. In the previous Summit in 2009, a recommendation stated that the National Conference should be held in early January 2015. This decision allowed the GOLKAR Party to concentrate on confronting the 2014 Legislative and President-Vice Presidential Elections (Sekretariat The GOLKAR 2009). In this case, the juridical basis for the National Conference to be held in January 2015 was emphasized, according to the opposition elite in the GOLKAR Party. However, the proposal was rejected by Agung Laksono, Vice Chairman of the Party's opposition elite. This was because the commencement of the National Conference in January 2015 was likely to lead to the violation of rules by the leadership of Aburizal Bakrie. According to the Party's Articles of Association and Bylaws, management only prevailed for five years. In addition, the leadership of Aburizal

Bakrie was considered a failure, with the GOLKAR Party vote dropping from 106 to 91 DPR RI seats. This led to the failure to advance in the presidential and vice-presidential elections.

Table 1. GOLKAR Vote and Seat Acquisition
Vote Acquisition (%)

2004 Election	2009 Election	2014 Election	2019 Election
21,58%	14,45%	14,75%	12,31%

Parliament Seat Acquisition

2004 Election	2009 Election	2014 Election	2019 Election
128	106	91	85

In this case, Agung Laksono declared that the cause of the repulsion against Aburizal Bakrie's leadership was due to the following factors. Firstly, the leadership highly considered personal business interests more than the organization. Secondly, the politics outside the GOLKAR Party did not want the resumption of authority. During an interview session, Agung Laksono also stated the following, *"Since the political parliamentary support for the Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla governments was weak, the support of the GOLKAR Party was needed. This was because the government required good political stability, which is likely to be disrupted when the Party joins the opposition group led by Prabowo Subijanto, whose loss in the 2014 presidential and vice-presidential elections was emphasized"* (Interview;15;07;22).


Based on this argument, the elite opposition group led by Agung Laksono communicated and cooperated with the party elites supporting the Joko Widodo administration. These elites included the NASDEM (National Democratic Party) and PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) Chairmen, Surya Paloh and Megawati Soekarnoputri, respectively. Regarding the elections, they cooperated with Agung Laksono to thwart Aburizal Bakrie's leadership for the second time. According to Agung Laksono, the following statements were declared during an interview session, *"My relationship with Surya Paloh and Megawati Soekarnoputri is very good. After I successfully organized the National Conference in Ancol Jakarta, they accepted. This proved that the acquisition of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Decree was a form of real support from the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla government"* (Interview;15;07;22). Based on an informant, the commencement of the Ancol National Conference was a method to dethrone Aburizal Bakrie from the Chairman of the GOLKAR Party, with the support being moral and material. The following is the statement of the informant during an interview session, *"I once took funds from someone close to these figures and delivered them to Agung Laksono's group. These funds were used to organize the Ancol National Conference and the movement against Aburizal Bakrie. However, I denied the purpose of the funds when confronted by the Nasdem cadre that became the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Human Rights, Tedjo Edhy Purdijanto"* (interview;07;07;2022). This information was highly relevant, considering that the position of Aburizal Bakrie was a parliamentary barrier to the government. From this context, many government policies are blocked in parliament because various authoritative opponents control the leadership of the Council Organs (AKD). Therefore, every government policy, such as the Healthy and Smart Indonesia Card Programs, practically withers before being felt by the people (Detik.Com 17;092014; Tempo. Co, 01/11/2016).

The peak of this conflict was observed when the plenary meeting of the GOLKAR Party failed to decide on the time and place of the IX National GOLKAR Party Conference on November 25, 2014. Based on Tempo Weekly Magazine, the GOLKAR Party administrators present stood up, and the glasses on the tables were slammed. Some people also threw water bottles at Theo L. Sambuaga and Secretary General Idrus Marham. Regarding an angry participant, the following statement was obtained, *"That is an announcement and not a meeting!"*. In this case, Theo and Idrus abandoned the room and were rushed to their cars to leave the party office (Tempo Magazine 07/12/2014). From the arena of the GOLKAR Party plenary meeting that failed to decide, the elite group was subsequently established. This indicated that the Rescue Team assumed control of the GOLKAR Party's leadership responsibilities (Kompas; 28;11;2014). Since this takeover, dualism has reportedly been observed in the GOLKAR Party leadership, with two camps always politically and legally conflicting. These camps often attempt to politically gain influence in Indonesia's parliamentary institutions while suing each other regarding the legal aspect.

The government's alignment with Agung Laksono was observed from the issuance of the Indonesia Law and Human Rights Minister Decree Number M. HH-01.AH.11.01 of 2015, March 23, 2015. This decree emphasizes the ratification of the GOLKAR Party Central Leadership Council Management under the authority of H.R. Agung Laksono and Zainudin Amali as Chairman and Secretary General, respectively. In this case, the decision reinforced the outputs of the rival National Conference in Ancol, North Jakarta, Indonesia, with mutual suits ensuing. Moreover, the Supreme Court returned the 2009 Riau National Conference management of Aburizal Bakrie and Agung Laksono as Head and Deputy Chairmen of the GOLKAR Party Central Leadership Council, respectively. This was to organize an Extraordinary National Conference toward conflict resolution.

In the "middle" of this conflict, a distance was implemented by the state, which had supported the elite group led by Agung Laksono, according to the perspective of Aburizal Bakrie. In this case, the following statements were obtained from Bakrie during an interview session, "The issuance of the Indonesia Law and Human Rights Minister Decree reported violence that was unaddressed by the police and the permission to hold the complex National Conference. We are aware of the government's position, and it seems that they are not in favour of me. However, after winning at the Supreme Court, President Joko Widodo contacted me and offered to run again. Therefore, I declared I was old and preferred to let the young ones do it" (Interview 26;08;2022). In this conflict, the Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla administrations were in a difficult position, as the consecutive intervention was considered not neutral. From this context, the government is capable of losing and not implementing its programs when the conflict is prolonged. This proved that all programs are likely to be hampered by the opposition led by GOLKAR, Gerindra, PAN, PKS, and PPP. This is because the Red and White Coalition controls 313 seats in parliament, leading to the easy thwarting of government programs. Meanwhile, only 247 seats are led by the parties supporting the government, namely PDIP, PKB, Nasdem, and Hanura. This indicated that the government inevitably attempted to attract the GOLKAR Party to support the Joko Widodo administration.

Table 2. Support Map of Joko Widodo's Government in Parliament



Based on previous periods, the ruling government often attempted to weaken the opposition by providing cabinet seats. For the GOLKAR Party, the candidates capable of cooperating with the government were selected aside from the provision of cabinet seats. This exhibited a mutual relationship between the government and the GOLKAR Party elite planning to seize the helm. Despite the steep and winding road, the government still mediated the two opposing camps through Vice President Jusuf Kalla. According to Tempo magazine, Aburizal communicated with Kalla for almost an hour, perspective explaining the party's problems. The permit to hold the National Conference in Bali was also questioned due to being unaddressed by the police. In addition, Aburizal sought Kalla's opinions on resolving the increasingly heated conflict.

Based on Kalla's response, the successor was advised to postpone the schedule of the national meeting, accommodate all candidates for chairman, and consider voting. From this context, several observations proved that "Ical did not agree on the time". Kalla also confirmed being in phone communication with Agung Laksono, the recent Chairman of the Presidium appointed to Save the Party by Aburizal's opponents. From the response, the following statements were presented: "The next day, Agung came to the Vice President's official residence in Jalan Diponegoro, Central Jakarta, where discussions were conducted based on saving the party. He also offered to be a mediator to bring together the feuding party elites before the meeting, although I dismissed the intervention notion due to our obligations as group cadres. After the conversation, I agreed with the decision of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno, to ban Aburizal's version of the National Conference in Bali".

According to Jusuf Kalla, the involvement in the GOLKAR Party conflict was due to being a party cadre and ensuring that the political group did not emulate the mass organizations not involved in the 2015 Pilkada contestation. Kalla also moved quickly to mediate and lobby to emphasize the conflict-ridden party to participate in the 2015 simultaneous regional head elections. In this case, the Indonesia General Election Commission was ordered to develop regulations capable of accommodating conflicting parties. From this context, the following statements were presented, *"The candidate pairs running in the elections should have the signatures of the General Chairman and Secretary of the two conflicting camps, especially for the GOLKAR"* (Interview, 22/09-2022). Before this agreement, Kalla admitted to inviting those in conflict to determine alternative resolutions that would be conducive to the political situation. This was because the conflict had reached the regions where two administrations were observed. A rebuttal was also delivered by Coordinating Minister for Politics, Tedjo Edhy Purdijanto, regarding the accusation that the government had intervened in the GOLKAR Party. According to Tedjo, the authority was interested in maintaining a conducive political atmosphere, and the complication of the permit implementing the National Conference of the Aburizal Bakrie camp in Bali was denied. The government was reluctant to permit this conference because Bali was a destination for foreign tourists before the close of 2014. From this context, the occurrence of a clash is capable of tainting the reputation of the country due to the high level of feeling foreigners in Bali feel. In this case, Tedjo provided the following statements, *"I asked for it to be held before December. Although my goal was not to interfere in the internal GOLKAR, my persistent thoughts about the nation's interests locally and internationally led to my intervention. Since many countries were vacationing in Bali, I did not want a situation where the GOLKAR Party had to engage in a physical fight capable of tarnishing the country's reputation. However, the GOLKAR Party did not accept this reason, leading to the question, "Why should the Coordinating Minister for Politic, Legal and Security interfere in an internal affair?"* (Interview, 15/04;2022).

Based on these descriptions, the government mediated to determine a common platform in the 2015 Regional Head Elections. In this case, both camps agreed that the candidates proposed to the Indonesia General Elections Commission (KPU RI) should be jointly approved. Subsequently, peace was achieved by establishing a joint team of three members from each group to select candidates for regional heads through surveys and good track records (Republika; 25/05;2015). Based on this conflict, the GOLKAR Party only won 49 regions, compared to PDIP at 105. Another consensus built by the conflicting elite factions was the organization of a joint or reconciliation National Conference, where the committee combined and integrated the unified camps into the Decree of the Indonesia Law and Human Rights Minister (Detik. Com;10/03;2016).

3.2 National Conference 2016; President Joko Widodo VS Vice President Jusuf Kalla battle

The 2016 GOLKAR National Conference in Nusa Dua Bali was a power struggle between President Joko Widodo and Vice President Jusuf Kalla. Despite the president's disapproval of endorsing a candidate at the Extraordinary National Conference (Republika; 24/05/2016), a senior GOLKAR politician, Yorrys Raweyai, stated that the Minister of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Luhut Panjaitan, was still authorized to help Setya Novanto win the election, as provided in the following statements,

Yes, there are many processes and alternatives where Mr Jusuf Kalla supports Mr Ade Komarudin. However, Mr. Luhut and all of us supported Setya Novanto. (Interview 09/06/2022)

Another informant stated that President Joko Widodo's support for Setya Novanto was apparent during a meeting between both politicians. According to the narrative, the president did not provide any response when asked about the intentions and identities of the running candidates, as observed in the following question,

"Mr. President, which candidate among those mentioned do you oppose?"

Based on the question, the names of several candidates were provided, and the president provided different responses when Ade Komarudin and Setya Novanto were declared. For Ade Komarudin, the president stated that the candidate was appropriate for the Speaker of the House role due to the indispensability possessed. Meanwhile, Setya Novanto was appreciated for maintaining communication with different parties and hardworking from the bottom to the top of the political rankings. In this case, President Jokowi favored Setya Novanto for the upcoming chairman position at DPP GOLKAR.

The above descriptions supported the information provided by Rizal Malarangeng, a GOLKAR intellectual close to Ical who is presently serving as a commissioner in one of the state-owned enterprises. This intellectual informant presented the following statements during one of the interview sessions.

"Mr Jusuf Kalla and Mr Luhut wanted Mr Ade Komarudin and Novanto, respectively, which is normal in a democracy. The fact is that Novanto won the election" (Rizal Malarangeng interview: 28-08-2022)

According to the interview session, Jusuf Kalla supported the ambition and objectives of Ade Komarudin during the election period. This support was due to the candidate's leadership ability and origination from the Islamic Student Association or HMI alumni, as presented in the following statements,

I support Ade Komarudin because he is a cadre member who has been trained in GOLKAR. I certainly have an identity, and he is an HMI alumnus. Because this is academic, I am telling the truth. I know that Novanto has had problems. Therefore, I support Ade; one of the reasons is that I don't want the Chairman of GOLKAR to have problems. Secondly, I am closer to Ade, who, besides being subjective, objectively has the ability too. He was once the Speaker of the People Representative (Jusuf Kalla interview: 14-09-2022)

Jusuf Kalla subsequently stated that the defeat of Ade Komarudin prioritized the great capital and government support for Setya Novanto. This was specifically observed in the arena of the Extraordinary National Conference in Bali. Jusuf Kalla was also unwilling to use the power of the Vice President to counterbalance the opponent, as presented in the following statement.

"I don't want to. I don't want conflict between government officials there."

Subsequent data showed that Kalla did not prefer Novanto leading GOLKAR due to the candidate's usage of the position for business interests. These data were appropriately stated in the following interview session with the informant.

From the beginning, I did not like Novanto. Everyone knows that when I was chairman of GOLKAR, I did not give any position to Novanto. This is because I knew his behavior; I knew what Novanto was doing, blackmailing everywhere, introducing his membership to manage his business (Interview Jusuf Kalla: 14-09-2022).

Based on the response, Jusuf Kalla did not communicate personal favoritism for Ade Komarudin with President Jokowi because the strength of GOLKAR was highly important and should be controlled by an individual with no legal problems. The Secretary of Ade Komarudin Success Team, Misbakhun, also observed a change in the political constellation leading to a transition in the president's attitude toward Ade Komarudin's candidacy. This transition prioritized the perception of Ade Komarudin being supported by Vice President Jusuf Kalla, as both were alumni of the Islamic Student Association or HMI. Therefore, President Jokowi did not specifically want the vice president to have more political power, as presented in the following statements,

In terms of political constellation, if the vice president has a higher political position, he is worried, especially if the person who becomes one of the chairmen of a major party, belongs to the number two person in Indonesia, is then not under the full control of the president, the president too, I think he will lose a certain percentage". The president should have full power. The president's political power should be full one hundred percent; he should not lose his role in one of the parties, or his role in one party should be degraded or experience a gradual decline in power. If the gradation means that the president does not have full power but is partially controlled by other people, that should not happen. The President may see the situation as a fear of the pattern of the relationship between Mr. Jusuf Kalla and Mr. Ade Komarudin, who are both alumni of the Islamic Student Association. The President sees that his position may be dangerous for Jokowi's power. Therefore, his political roles will be eroded, reduced, or disrupted; it could be with the vice president because the vice president controls political parties. (Misbakhun interview 03-08-2022)

According to the interview responses, the participation of the ruling government in the contestation at the National Conference was unavoidable because GOLKAR was a big party with extensive experience, upholding the second-largest number of seats and several regional leaders. For Misbakhun, Ade Komarudin had multiple meetings with President Joko Widodo, encountering no opposition. From the description, the President initially supported Ade Komarudin during the nomination process. However, the influence of specific groups led to the transition of Jokowi toward Ade Komarudin, indirectly adjusting allegiance through intermediaries. Supportive information about the transition was also obtained from Firman Subagyo, a member of the Ade Komarudin Success Team. This informant stated that Ade Komarudin was not a Jokowi candidate, as identified by the State Intelligence Agency (Firman Subagyo interview 05-09-2023).

The support of President Joko Widodo led to Setya Novanto being elected as Chairman of the GOLKAR Party by gaining the most votes (277), beating Ade Komarudin, Azis Syamsudin, Syahrul Yasin Limpo, Airlangga Hartarto, Mahyudin, as well as Priyo Budi Santoso and Indra Bambang Utuyo with 173, 48, 27, 14, 2, and 1 tallies, respectively (Republik;17/05/2016). Since Setya Novanto and Ade Komarudin obtained 30% of the votes, both were entitled to advance to the second stage. However, Ade withdrew and declared support for the highest vote-getter, with Setya becoming the automatic winner. Another important decision in the Extraordinary National Conference was the inclusion of the GOLKAR Party into the Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla government coalition.

According to the perspective of Frederick Engelsted, a consensus was needed to defuse conflict in decision-making processes (Engelsted 2010), accompanied by the performance of institutionalization between conflicted elites. For the relationship between the elite and the state, institutionalization should also be carried out simultaneously. Moreover, the two framed elite groups exalted each other's interests before the National Conference, with everyone feeling entitled to manage and control the organization. Jusuf Kalla, Indonesia's vice president and the GOLKAR Party cadre, also adopted the initiative, with both conflicting elite groups accommodating their interests. This was accompanied by the joint performance of decision-making and the National Conference committee consensus. Despite the accommodation of each group, the state still played an active role in the GOLKAR Party case. The conflicted elites, such as institutional theorists, did not also return the disruption to the pre-existing rules of the organization, indicating the high intervention of the state (Aisah, 2021).

Elite theorists Higley and Burton also provided theoretical clues for exclusive integration. This was observed through the network of each elite to decision-making, with three categories provided to determine the unity level. Firstly, strong integration and broad differentiation developed voluntary elite consensus. Secondly, strong integration and narrow differentiation provided forced elite consensus. Thirdly, weak integration and broad differentiation led to widely fragmented and competitive pluralism, where no faction had power over other groups (Higley & Burton 2010).

From these three categories and models, the GOLKAR Party belonged to the weak integration and wide differentiation group. This weak integration was found in the relationship between the GOLKAR Party organization elites, which is prone to rupture. In building exclusive cooperation, no strong ideological ties were observed. This was because the cooperation emphasized the accommodation levels of interests. Based on differentiation, many elites had a political base, with the relevance of Etzioni's perspective prioritized during the development of democracy through the existence of elite equality, according to the quotation of Engelsted. From this context, the perspective focused on the experience of Western countries with established democratic traditions. In this case, differences were evident in Indonesia with the GOLKAR Party case study. Although the factions were equal, the elites were still very dependent on the state. This proved that Etzioni's autonomy claim was not found in the GOLKAR Party case.

3.3 Political Base of the GOLKAR Party Elite

The GOLKAR Party does not have a dominant elite or figures compared to PDIP, Nasdem, or Democrats. This Party consists of many figures and factionalism, each having a political base. Based on American political scientist Samuel P Huntington provided various perspectives on community groups, which were tied to a social base. Firstly, Class is a group of individuals with similar social and economic status. Secondly, Communal groups are individuals of the same ethnic or religious categories. Thirdly, A Neighborhood is a group of individuals geographically living in the same place/environment. Fourthly, Parties are groups of individuals identified with the same formal organization, seeking to achieve or maintain control over the executive and legislative fields at the state level. Fifthly, Faction groups are individuals united by continuous interaction with one another, such as the patron-client relationship, which involves the exchange of interests assuming the same statuses are not observed. In Huntington's category, these groups were used to analyze the social base of the GOLKAR Party elite. Based on this present study, only the social bases of the main elites involved in the conflict, namely Agung Laksono and Aburizal Bakrie, were reviewed.

The career of Agung was deeply embedded in the GOLKAR due to being the Head Chairperson (1998-2004) and Deputy Chairman (2004-2009) of the DPP GOLKAR Party. This elite had headed the GOLKAR's wing, *Angkatan Muda Pembaruan Indonesia* (AMPI), as well as Central Leadership Secretary-General and General Chairman of the Collective Union of Multipurpose Organizations *Gotong-Royong* (Kosgoro), with Leo Nababan indicating that "*His track record is long*" (Merdeka. Com;13;12;2019). Agung also visited cadres diligently at the regency and city levels when visiting the regions. Ahead of the exclusive conflict, this elite often gathered the GOLKAR Party administrators in every area attended, such as Garut, Sukabumi, Tegal, Yogyakarta, Jombang, and Situbondo. According to him, "*I have been doing this since I became the Minister of Youth and Sports in the Soeharto era*". As Chairman of Kosgoro, the influence of Agung was highly efficient and effective. From this context, two governors acted as Kosgoro Chairmen in their provinces, namely Anwar Adnan Saleh and Syahrul Yasin Limpo in West and South Sulawesi, respectively. Meanwhile, East Kalimantan Kosgoro Chairman Mukmin Faisyal served as deputy governor. Regarding these elites, Adnan Saleh and Sahrul Yasin Limpo had moved to the PAN and Nasdem Parties, respectively, with Mukmin Faisal already dead. In Joko Widodo's second term, Agung Laksono had been serving as a member of the Presidential Advisory Council since 2019. In 2009-2014 and 2004-2009, he was the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare and the Representatives Council Chairman, respectively. At the IX National Deliberation of the GOLKAR Party with his political base, he formed a management that was legalized by the Indonesia Minister of Law and Human Rights. By possessing this authorization, the Aburizal Bakrie camp filed a lawsuit, with a compromise subsequently achieved through the state, regarding the performance of a joint National Conference.

From the perspective of Huntington, the base of Agung prioritized the neighbourhood, a group of individuals geographically living in the same place/environment. In addition, his political base focused on factions, a group of individuals united by continuous interaction with one another. In Yudy and Prima's study on the GOLKAR Party Splinter, Agung Laksono was grouped into Javanese factionalization (Yuddy & Prima 2014) due to the origin of his birthplace, Semarang, Central Java. Although this categorization was weakly argued, it was still relevant for experimental performance, as the social base of Agung was often developed based on neighbourhoods. Moreover, a distinct advantage was provided in sustaining his political career as Chairman of Kosgoro. Regarding Agung's participation in the GOLKAR Party contestation, Kosgoro members and administrators largely supported his political movements. This led to the following response he provided during an interview session, *"Very supportive, although not as a whole, it is still the movement of the GOLKAR Party"* (interview; 14;07;2022).

The main factor that encouraged Kosgoro officials to join Agung's elite faction was due to their similar organization. According to Iswara, a supporter, his relationship with Agung had been established for a long time. Besides both being raised by Kosgoro, Agung's capacity was highly capable of replacing Aburizal Bakrie to lead the GOLKAR Party (interview; 21;11;2021). This was in line with the perspective of Syamsul Hidayat, Chairman of the Kosgoro Regional Leadership in Bogor City, West Java. From this context, all Kosgoro members supported Agung Laksono's move to improve the party. During an interview session, Syamsul stated the following, *"Agung Laksono, as Chairman of Kosgoro, is a symbol of the organization. Therefore, as a member of the Kosgoro organization, I fully support his policies. When some do not follow Agung's direction, that is their right, and they should not use the organization's symbol"* (Interview;02;02;2023). However, not all Kosgoro cadres follow the lead of Chairman Agung Laksono. This included Rambe Kamarulzaman, who believed the conflict between the Bali and Ancol National Conference destroyed the GOLKAR. In this case, appropriate reconciliation should be considered an alternative between the two camps. Based on an interview session, Rambe provided the following statements, *"As chairman of Commission II of the Representatives Council, I encourage the Indonesia General Election Commission to make regulations that can accommodate both camps to participate in the 2015 Simultaneous Regional Head Polls. This is part of my effort to maintain the Kosgoro existence instead of being involved in a conflict developed on behalf of Kosgoro"* (Interview; 02;02;2023).

The childhood and high school years of Aburizal Bakrie were carried out in Jakarta, with his father being a prominent businessman from Lampung, Sumatra, Indonesia. Besides leading various organizations, he was also an active Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) alumni, where his services encompassed Chairman of the Electrical Student Senate and ITB-Student Council. After completing his studies, Aburizal entered the business world, developing his parents' legacy company, Bakrie Group. Despite the ups and downs, he continued to manage his father's business. Once down during the 1998 economic crisis, Aburizal company's debt was greater than its assets. Slowly, he rose out of the crisis and was declared the richest person in Indonesia by the economic magazine Forbes in 2001. Under his management, the father's company developed rapidly, becoming one of the leading organizations in Indonesia. Ical, as he is popularly known, has also served as Chairman of KADIN (Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry) and HIPMI (Indonesian Young Entrepreneurs Association). In the government, he served as Coordinating Minister for the Economy (2004-2005) and People's Welfare (2005-2009). Moreover, the political career of Aburizal Bakrie began with the GOLKAR Party since the New Order government. From this context, the elite's career peak emphasized the appointment as Chairman of the GOLKAR Party for the 2009-2014 period after successfully defeating Surya Paloh at the National Conference in Pekanbaru Riau Indonesia (Viva.Co.id; 22; 11; 2022).

Similar to Agung Laksono, based on the perspective of Huntington, Aburizal Bakrie depended on his political base, which emphasized neighbourhoods and factions. The supporters of this elite mostly originated from Lampung, Sumatra, where his father was born. However, the main political base of Aburizal revolved around the Kadin and Himpi activists, who were his real supporters and close friends, such as Adi Taher, MS Hidayat, and Bambang Susatyo. According to Ical, all organizations were the same in terms of the patterns by which they organized their logistical forces and coordinated people's thinking towards a clear goal. During an interview session, he stated the following, *"Whether you want to lead a government or private/political organization, no difference was found in coordinating the power of people and logistics through similar goals"* (interview; 26;08;2022). This indicated that Ical felt successful when leading government organizations, professions and political parties. Therefore, this valuable experience needs to be considered a political base.

According to Bambang Susatyo, one of Ical's supporters, the Bali National Conference was legitimate due to being appropriate to the GOLKAR Party Articles of Association and Bylaws. However, with a big soul, Aburizal Bakrie was willing to organize an Extraordinary National Conference to end the conflict. During an interview, Bambang stated the following, *"This is the first time in the long history of the GOLKAR Party where knees bow and bend to the cruelty of power that does not want Ical as chairman, by using the weapon of the authorization decree"*. However, Ical was a great soul and statesman because he did not allow the National Conference to be postponed until the registration stage for the 2017 simultaneous regional elections, which were due in July 2016.

In Bambang's statement during an interview, "*The GOLKAR Party can prepare itself well with an intact management, without the dualism of management that existed during the previous simultaneous elections*" (Merdeka. Com;24;01'2016).

This was in line with the analysis of Aisyah, where the cases of Aburizal Bakrie in the GOLKAR Party band Surya Dharma Ali's PPP confirmed the government's role in political party intervention. Besides the prolonged conflict, the impact of the intervention also accelerated the new chairman election, as desired by the government. This authoritative interference was obtained with the rupture of the elite, especially through weak institutionalization. Based on Frederick Engelsted, a stable democracy needs to be supported by elite integration, game rules development for members to access decision-making accessibility, as well as the enhancement of shared perceptions and interdependent feelings (Engelsted 2010). Moreover, a stable democracy requires the institutionalization of at least two factors: (1) Laws contributing to the regulation of conflict and (2) A set of constitutive rules regulating the order of interests among different institutional arenas. In this context, the GOLKAR Party had been institutionalized and followed a predetermined schedule for the National Conference every five years. Regarding critical matters, the National Conference required support from two-thirds of the Regional Representative Council I Province. Despite these rules, the elites still lacked respect, especially when the party chairman was considered a failure and wrong in determining the presidential election and support for relevant candidates. This was observed in the conflict between the Aburizal Baki and Agung Laksono factions as the initiators of the Bali and Ancol National Conferences, respectively. The conflict occurrences were considered to have disrupted political stability in Indonesia, leading to governmental reconciliation. Meanwhile, some people emphasized this reconciliation as interference with political parties.

4. Conclusion

Based on the results, the impact of elite pluralism prioritized the sharpness of factionalization in the GOLKAR Party. In this case, each elite felt equal without a main figure controlling the party. All elites also felt they had a similar strong social base, capital, and network, leading to an inevitable split at a specific period. According to Eva Etzioni Halevy and quoted by Engelsted, this condition was good capital, with the exclusives possessing equal and balanced positions. The GOLKAR Party elites also had similar opportunities to be elected as top leaders, as those with chances of becoming supreme authorities having strong political stature and base. Moreover, popularity, integrity and good leadership were required assets for contestation. The elites building cooperation with the government was also a key factor in the success of the contestation.

The results also showed that elite pluralism had developed in the GOLKAR Party. This was relevant to the perspective of Eva Etzioni through the quotation by Engelsted, where all elites had similar opportunities. However, the GOLKAR Party was not founded on the elite autonomy perspective. This was because autonomy was always inferior to government interests, as the ruling authority often preferred to only work with elites. The GOLKAR Party exclusives also desired and scrambled for cooperation and support from the government. This phenomenon was typical of the democracy developed in Indonesia, where all organizations were inseparable from the influence of the ruling authority. Therefore, the presentation of a critical organization balanced with the state was very difficult, especially in the elite autonomy of Halevy's perspective.

Based on Frederick Engelsted, institutionalization was encouraged in two patterns, namely (1) The relations between elites and (2) The associations between elites and the state. Although game rules were observed as a process of institutionalization or consensus, the GOLKAR Party exclusives still violated them. For example, the elites were reluctant to comply with the regulations regarding the destruction of a country in the Weimar Kingdom case. From the results, the agreed conflict resolution was considered not to fully accommodate all elites' interests. In Engelsted, the elites cooperated as long as the interests of the people were maintained. The GOLKAR Party conflict also illustrated that the diverse interests of the elite were not accommodated during Aburizal Bakrie's leadership. This indicated that the elite faction led by Agung Laksono held a National Conference and provided a new leadership approved by the government. In this case, the approval forced Ical to negotiate and finally agree to conduct an Extraordinary National Conference to end the conflict. This is where the interests of the state featured the elites cooperating with the government, such as Agung Laksono. Regarding elite integration, the GOLKAR Party belonged to the category of weak integration and wide differentiation, according to Higley and Burton. In this model, the composition of the elite was widely fragmented and competitive, with no faction having full power over other groups. The weakness of this model emphasized the instability of the organizations, leading to the frequent occurrence of splits, based on Yudi and Prima in the splinter GOLKAR Party. Therefore, the losing elites are forced to form a new party or a rival leadership. The antagonistic cooperation developed by Heinrich Best (2010) is also the appropriate model to be developed in GOLKAR, accompanied by the accommodation of different elites' interests in the decision-making sector having permanent positions. This cooperation model is used to achieve greater interests, specifically the preference for an advanced, useful, and efficient organization.

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